

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 103 975

EA 006 898

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TITLE Gubernatorial Involvement in Education.
PUB DATE 2 Apr 75
NOTE 30p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (60th, March 31-April 4, 1975)

EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.76 HC-\$1.95 PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS Decision Making; *Educational Legislation; Elementary Secondary Education; *Governance; Groups; *Policy Formation; *Political Issues; State Departments of Education; *State Government; State Officials

IDENTIFIERS *State Governors

ABSTRACT

This research on 12 States' gubernatorial involvement in State educational policy formation investigates four functional stages of that involvement--issue definition, proposal formulation, support mobilization, and decision enactment. Drawing on the Educational Governance Project information and interviews, a gubernatorial involvement index was developed. The findings indicate that governors have a varied involvement in educational policymaking; that the nature of the involvement varies; and that some governors work through staff aides, but others involve themselves directly. Gubernatorial involvement was found to be crucial in school finance and tax reform measures; however, the governmental structure is only one facet of gubernatorial involvement. A correlational analysis shows that selected fiscal variables of State tax burden, educational effort, and educational expenditures are most strongly associated with gubernatorial involvement. Based on this research, governors have clearly activated their potential and have become involved in State policymaking for the public schools. (Author/DW)

ED103975

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1923
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GUBERNATORIAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION

by

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**Prepared for presentation at the
1975 Annual Meeting of the
American Educational Research Association
Washington, D.C., April 2, 1975**

EA 003 898

Introduction

Recent evidence in the states indicates that gubernatorial interest and involvement in education is on the increase. A governor's appointment of a state official to serve as a "watchdog" over public elementary and secondary education in New York,¹ executive initiative which led to the merger of two systems of higher education in Wisconsin,² new structures for education at the state level in Illinois and Massachusetts,³ and a governor's recent recommendation to abolish the state-wide higher educational coordinating agency which he helped conceive in Ohio⁴ -- portend a future in which the myth of keeping education apart from politics will be totally inoperative.

This research on gubernatorial involvement in education grew out of the Educational Governance Project (EGP), a two-year national inquiry funded by the U.S. Office of Education. The EGP was designed to expand knowledge about how policies for public schools were formulated at the state level and to develop alternative governance models.⁵ Case studies describing state policy-making systems for public schools in each of twelve states, material from secondary sources, and EGP interview schedules provided the data for this research. In each state there was a mean of thirty-five formal interviews, representative of those state-level actors who formulate policies for public schools. Interviewed were governors, and members of their personal staffs, state budget and finance experts, legislators and legislative staff, interest group representatives, and members of state education agencies.⁶

An earlier and somewhat extended version of this paper may be found in "State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis", Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni Jr., eds. Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, August 1974. Appreciation is given to Gino Danese, Research Fellow, S.U.N.Y. Albany, for interviews with gubernatorial aides, February 1975.

Drawing upon political systems and allocative theories, the state policy process was viewed as consisting of several functional stages:

- Issue Definition:** Process by which the preferences of individuals and groups become translated into political issues.
- Proposal Formulation:** Process by which issues are formulated as proposals for policy change or for maintaining the status quo.
- Support Mobilization:** Process by which individuals and groups are activated to support or oppose alternative policy proposals.
- Decision Enactment:** Process by which an authoritative policy choice is made.⁷

Governors' involvement in each of the four functional policy-making stages was determined from EGP case studies and analysis of interview schedules. An index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was constructed by analyzing the extent of their involvement in each policy-making stage. Gubernatorial involvement in state educational policy making was explained by use of the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient (Rho), by which gubernatorial involvement in education was correlated with socioeconomic and political background variables, school finance and tax variables, and policy-making variables.

Issue Definition

As chief executive, the governor has the opportunity to define policy issues. The visibility of the governor and the resources available enable him to select issues to be formulated into policy proposals, to define issues in ways in which their saliency can be maximized, and to emphasize those issues deemed important. Governors' involvement in issue definition was viewed according to the emphasis given to education as a 1970 campaign issue and according to the extent to which public schools were a top priority in their subsequent legislative programs.

Eight of the twelve governors and members of governors' personal staffs were interviewed regarding the emphasis given to

education as a 1970 campaign issue. In all states except Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska, those interviewed said that education had been visible as a campaign issue during the 1970 gubernatorial elections.

In governors' legislative program subsequent to 1970, education had been a priority issue in eight of the twelve states. Governors in California, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska had not emphasized education in their legislative programs. In California as one aide saw it, school finance was emphasized only "in the sense that it was part and parcel of the overall tax reform problem."⁸ In Colorado while the Governor was not active in education, school finance emerged as a major legislative issue in 1973. The Massachusetts Governor had not been oriented toward education and assigned educational matters to the Lieutenant Governor. In Nebraska, the Governor's main activity in education was his veto of a major school finance bill in 1972.

In the issue definition stage of the policy process, governors may be categorized according to their emphasis of education in the 1970 campaign and in their legislative programs. Governors in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, and Florida were actively involved in defining educational issues so as to stress the need for reform in school finance and taxation. There were several dimensions of this reform effort in school finance and taxation. There were attempts to increase the total funding for public schools, to raise the state share in local school funding, to achieve greater inter-district equalization, and to relieve the property tax burden.

In California, New York, and Nebraska, fiscal concerns of a different order were evident. These governors expressed the need for fiscal restraint, more than in achieving fiscal reform. In California in 1972, the impetus for tax reform was provided by the Governor with the press for school finance reform originating in the legislature. In 1972, the New York

Governor slowed the state's rising education costs by adopting a "zero growth" posture in the budget.⁹ The Nebraska Governor held to his 1970 campaign pledge for no new taxes by vetoing a major school finance bill in 1972.

Governors in Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas had been involved in education but more in the expansion of specific educational programs than in broad fiscal reform. In Georgia the issue was early childhood education, in Tennessee it was kindergarten education, and in Texas the issues were vocational and technical education.

Finally, it was clear that governors in Colorado and Massachusetts were not active in their involvement in education.

Proposal Formulation

In this second stage of the policy process, governors drew upon available resources for information and advice in order to formulate policy proposals. Informational resources included members of the governor's personal staff, others in the executive and legislative branches, and outside spokespersons for education.

Governor's Personal Staff

Members of governors' personal staffs facilitate in the generation of information, filtering input to the chief executive, formulating policy and program positions, and insuring that policy proposals can meet the rigors of legal and fiscal requirements. Sprengel summarized the basic purposes of governors' personal staffs as "information control and presentation."¹⁰

All persons serving governors in budgetary, legal, and program capacities were identified as of early 1973, and two individuals were interviewed in each state.¹¹ The mean number of years of service of these twenty-four staff members to governors, through 1972, was 3.8 indicating that there may be frequent staff turnover in governors' offices. With eight of the twelve governors serving their first term, it was understandable

why staff members would have had a brief tenure.

Some findings regarding governors' personal staffs emerge when staff data from these twelve states are compared with the findings of the forty-state survey by Sprengel.¹² In the EGP twelve-state population, 75 per cent of the governors' personal staff members had completed postgraduate study while in the Sprengel study it was found that 47 per cent had completed postgraduate study. Both EGP data and the Sprengel study demonstrated that governors' aides tend to have been politically socialized at an early age. Sprengel found that 38 per cent of the respondents had held a political position prior to serving on the governor's personal staff, and in this population of twelve states it was learned that 46 per cent of those staff members interviewed had served previously in state government, as a legislator, or as a student who became involved in the governor's campaigns. Five of the twenty-four staff members interviewed in this research had worked previously in education as professors, administrators in higher education, or as state educational officials. These last two findings are noteworthy. Of those education aides interviewed, nearly one-half had prior experience in state government or in politics, but only 20 per cent had worked in education. Further, of those who had previous educational experience, without exception their careers had been most recently in higher education. No staff members were located who had come directly from the public schools.

Not only was it evident that staff serve to generate information and position papers, but also it was clear that staff function in a key role in giving governors policy advice about educational matters. With the possible exception of Texas where the Governor relied upon the head of the teacher's association because of a long-time friendship, governors relied upon their own staff for advice and policy recommendations.

Informational Resources

Governors rely upon their personal staff members for

advice and recommendations, but they appear to solicit information and data about education from a variety of sources. When asked about who provided useful educational information, governors' staff members identified state departments of education most frequently. SDEs were mentioned by at least one staff member in each state as being useful educational resources, and in frequency SDEs were mentioned twice as often as either educational interest groups or sources within state government.

Another resource is the commission, citizen group, or task force. There were active such organizations in six of the twelve states, including the four states in which governors were oriented toward reform in school finance and taxation, in New York, and in Nebraska. Broad-based citizen groups existing in those states where governors had been active in fiscal reform indicate that governors may look to sources outside the executive branch and to viable citizen organizations. By using the public forum, citizen groups provide governors with a valuable resource.

Governors as Proposal Formulators

The office of the governor was the locus for the generation of policy proposals in education. Unlike the issue definition stage of the policy process where some governors were inactive in education, all twelve governors demonstrated activity in proposal formulation. Albeit some governors only attempted policy formulation, their activity suggests that Ransone's observation twenty years ago is still accurate that a preeminent role of governors is to formulate and initiate statewide policies.¹³

Governors were the key initiators in proposal formulation in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, and Florida. The outstanding example of policy initiation may have been in Minnesota where the Governor initiated a proposal for educational and tax reform and followed it through to final resolution by a legislative conference committee late in 1971. Reform in

Michigan had roots in the "Thomas Report," a study of some significance, which drew attention to the problem of school funding.¹⁴ An experienced state legislator, the Michigan Governor encountered a long series of entanglements with such issues as parochialism, fiscal austerity, and a statewide referendum on property taxes. The Wisconsin Governor's role in initiating educational reform was unmistakable. Forming a Task Force to study school finance in 1972, the Governor relied upon his political base in the Assembly in the passing of a district power equalization bill in 1973, came to a political standoff in the Senate, but achieved success by means of a legislative conference committee which passed the bill late in the session. In Florida, the Governor with the assistance of a Citizen's Committee served as the major initiator of school finance legislation in 1973.

In four other states, governors tended to share in initiating policy proposals with the legislature. School finance and tax reform was accomplished in California in 1972 with the Governor pressing for tax reform and the legislature initiating school finance reform. In achieving school finance reform in 1973 in Colorado, the enacted legislation incorporated the Governor's idea for a per cent equalization formula with that proposed by a coalition of interest groups. Pressure for school finance reform in New York mounted over several legislative sessions with the outcome in 1974 reflecting agreement between the Governor and the legislative leadership. In Tennessee, the Governor drew attention to the need to finance kindergarten education in 1970. While the Tennessee legislature enacted legislation in 1972, the bill fell far short of the Governor's expectations because of legislative compromise.

Governors in four states either attempted policy initiation or reacted to the legislative proposals submitted by others. In Georgia, the Governor gave passive support to legislation which increased teachers' salaries. The Massachusetts Governor attempted a graduated income tax proposal which eventually was

defeated at the polls. The Nebraska Governor reacted to legislative initiative in school finance by power of the veto. The Texas Governor watched as the State Board of Education took responsibility for meeting the mandate of the Federal District Court in the Rodriguez decision by submitting a school finance proposal.

Support Mobilization

After policy issues have been defined and formulated into proposals, support must be generated from available resources and mobilized in the legislative arena. Support mobilization includes drawing upon professional opinions of recognized experts, marshalling public support, and obtaining legislators' votes.

Governors and the SEA

The state education agency provides one resource for support mobilization. The structural relationship between the SEA and the governor may enhance or diminish the governor's potential to mobilize the support of the SEA. In the twelve states there were seven different combinations of selection methods for CSSOs and state board members.¹⁵

The parameters of this structural variability were defined by Tennessee, and New York and Wisconsin. The Tennessee Governor is involved in education because he appoints state board members as well as the Commissioner.* On the other hand, education is considered to be a fourth branch of government in New York. Elected by the legislature, members of the Board of Regents and the Commissioner of Education are separated from state government in both structure and process. Indeed, the New York Governor's appointment of an Education Inspector General in 1973 demonstrated, according to some individuals who were interviewed, the Governor's increasing frustration with the independence of the SEA. The insulation of education from state

* Illustration of this involvement was observed during this research when the Commissioner of Education resigned at the request of the Governor in November 1972.

government was evident in Wisconsin with no state board of education and a popularly-elected State Superintendent.

In the other nine states it was evident that structure was only one of several important factors in the governor-SEA relationship. In four states where board members were popularly elected and CSSOs were appointed by the state board, governor-SEA relationships were described by interviewees as either harmonious or minimally existent because education was viewed as being apart from politics. In another two states, where board members were gubernatorially appointed and CSSOs were board appointed, education was viewed as being apart from politics. And in two states having gubernatorially appointed boards and elected CSSOs, governor-SEA relationships were described as harmonious. In Georgia where the governor appoints the board and the CSSO is elected, the governor-CSSO relationship was openly contested. In the four states where extant governor-CSSO relationships were considered to be harmonious, interestingly, the relationship between the governor and the previous CSSO in each state was not without conflict. The reason for the conflict was ascribed to the CSSOs in California, Colorado, and Michigan, and to the previous Governor in Florida.

Governors and Educational Interest Groups

Thirty-two members of governors' personal staffs and state budget officials provided information about relationships between governors and the educational interest groups (EIGs). The modal response identified a generally open, working relationship between governors and EIG leaders, characterized by lack of governor reliance upon any one EIG and by lack of open conflict between governors and EIGs. Given the constituency representation by specific interest groups, such affable relationships might be expected. Yet, governors in Texas and Wisconsin did appear to rely upon teachers' associations for policy advice and recommendations, primarily because of personal relationships existing between those governors and the heads of the teachers' associations. On the other hand, a degree of contention was

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identified between governors and interest groups, specifically with teachers, in many of the states. This contention may have arisen because of the larger issue of teacher militancy over matters such as teacher welfare.¹⁶

Governors and The Legislature

Governors have formal powers as well as means by which their influence can be mobilized. Table 1 indicates how each state ranked on a five-point scale for each of four categories of formal power, as determined by Schlesinger. A twelve-state ranking is presented with the New York Governor ranked most powerful and Texas least powerful.

TABLE 1
GOVERNORS' FORMAL POWERS

State	CATEGORY & ASSIGNED SCORE ^a				Combined Index of Formal Powers	
	Tenure	Appointment	Budget	Veto	Schlesinger Score	12-State Rank ^c
Cal.	1	2	1	1	19	3
Colo.	1	5	2	1	15	8.5
Fla.	3	4	5	3	9	11
Ga.	3	5	1	1	14	10
Mass.	1	1	1	3	18	5
Mich.	1	2	1	1	19	3
Minn.	1	2	1	1	19	3
Neb.	2	3	2	1	16	7
N.Y.	1	1	1	1	20	1
Tenn.	3	1	1	2	17	6
Tex.	4	5	5	3	7	12
Wisc.	1	4	1	3	15	8.5

^aThere were five possible scores ranging from 1 (strongest) to 5 (weakest).

^bThe Schlesinger Score included 14 categories ranging from 20 (strongest) to 7 (weakest).

^cThe 12-state rank ranges from New York ranked 1st (strongest gubernatorial formal powers) to Texas ranked 12th (weakest formal powers).

SOURCE: Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Politics in the American States, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p.p. 210-237.

Two of these categories are related particularly to governors' legislative powers. In budgetary power, governors in eight of the twelve states were ranked in the highest category in having total control over budget formulation. In Colorado and Nebraska, governors had to share budget formulation responsibilities with someone other than their appointees. The Florida and Texas governors were ranked in the lowest category because others had as much budget formulation power. In veto power, seven of the twelve governors were ranked at the top due to their item veto power requiring

at least a 60 per cent legislative vote to override. The Tennessee Governor was ranked in the second of five categories because of his item veto power which required a majority of the legislature to override. The Florida, Massachusetts, Texas and Wisconsin governors were ranked in the third of five categories because their item vetoes could be overridden by a majority of only those legislators present.

Decision Enactment

This stage of the policy process culminates in decision making. But in choosing among alternative policy proposals, hard choices may have to be made. Thus, decision enactment is the point of reckoning for those who attempt to influence policy making by defining issues, formulating proposals, and mobilizing support.

Governors and Legislative Support

The crucial test for governors as they attempt to get policy proposals passed or defeated is in the legislative arena. The extent of support for the governor in the legislature is clearly dependent upon political party line-up. Governors' potential to get legislation passed in 1973 was related not only to their political base established early in their term of office (1971), but also to the change in party line-up as a result of the 1972 general elections.¹⁷

Governors had political party majorities in both legislative houses in 1971 and in 1973 in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, New York, and Texas. Governors had political party minorities in both houses in both years in California, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. In Minnesota, the Governor had minorities in both houses in 1971 and majorities in both houses in 1973. There were political party splits in Michigan and Wisconsin.*

Further understanding of governors' legislative political party support must include inter-party competition. If the governor is of the majority party in a traditionally one-party state, the significance of the legislative majority may well be diminished because of intra-party factionalism¹⁸ which was quite evident in Florida, Georgia, and Texas. Ranney classified Tennessee as one-

*See APPENDIX for definition of political party split.

party Democratic, and California and Massachusetts tended toward one-party Democratic.¹⁹ With Republican governors in those three states, it was evident that there was formidable political party opposition to governors in the legislatures.

Governors and Legislative Party Influence

By use of the Ranney classification of inter-party competition and the political party line-up in the twelve states in 1971 and 1973, the strength of the governor's political party base may be seen in Table 2.

TABLE 2
GOVERNORS, LEGISLATIVE POLITICAL PARTY LINE-UP, AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Inter-Party Competition	Legislative Political Party Line-up, 1971 to 1973				
	Remained Majority	Remained Minority	Majority to Minority	Minority to Majority	Split
One-party Democratic	Georgia Texas				
Modified One-party Democratic	Florida	Tennessee			
Two-party	Colorado New York	California Massachusetts		Minnesota	Michigan Wisconsin
Modified One-party Republican					

SOURCES: *The Book of the States, 1972-1973* (Lexington, Kentucky: The Council of State Governments, 1973), and Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in *Politics in the American States*, M. Jacob and K.N. Vines, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p.p. 82-121.

Members of governors' personal staffs, state budget officials, and state education department staff working in legislative affairs were questioned as to the extent of governors' legislative party influence. The Minnesota Governor was found to be in the strongest position. In addition to his formal powers, the success of the Democrat-Farmer-Labor party in the 1972 election was aided by the Governor's ability to command significant resources: position and personality gave the Governor leverage, he had high standing among key members of his political party, and he quickly developed his own staff resources.²⁰ After the Minnesota legislature in 1971 had passed a compromise combination school finance and tax bill in special session, the Governor vetoed the bill and successfully took it to the public drawing attention to what he believed was inadequate tax relief.

Four other governors were in strong legislative positions,

according to interview data. The Wisconsin and Michigan governors, although faced with split legislative houses, effectively gained the necessary votes for reform in school finance and taxation. In New York there was no doubt about the political strength of Nelson Rockefeller and the support given to his policy proposals by the Republican legislative leaders. While not active in education at least until 1973, the Colorado Governor appeared to be successful in getting his legislative programs passed about 80 per cent of the time, according to one legislative aide.

Not only were the California, Massachusetts, and Tennessee governors faced with majority party opposition in their legislatures, but also their difficulty in obtaining political party support for their legislative programs was clear. Legislative compromise diluted the Tennessee Governor's proposal for statewide financing of kindergarten education. By compromise with the legislative leadership, the California Governor was able to claim some success in school finance and tax reform in 1972. The Massachusetts Governor had to rely upon the support of the Republican party as well as liberal Democrats whenever possible.

Governors in Florida, Georgia, and Texas had rather weak political party support in legislatures. School finance reform in Florida was an especially difficult problem, given the party factionalism which eroded the Governor's support and the budgetary process which gave governmental agency heads the opportunity to lobby directly in the legislature. The Georgia Governor's style was considerably different from his predecessor's and interpreted by those interviewed as somewhat aloof. The Texas Governor was ranked last in formal powers and was hampered by a dispersal of executive authority and a factionalized system of political party alignments.

Correlational Analysis

An index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was constructed by assigning numerical values to the extent of their involvement in each functional stage of the policy process, as shown in Table 3. By combining the score for each governor in each policy-making stage, a total score was obtained and a ranking was derived.

TABLE 3
AN INDEX OF GUBERNATORIAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING

State	Issue Definition	Proposal Formulation	Support Mobilization	Decision Enactment	Total Score	Ranking
California	2	4	4	4	14	6
Colorado	2	2	2	1	7	10
Florida	4	4	3	4	15	5
Georgia	5	1	1	1	8	9
Massachusetts	1	2	2	1	6	11
Michigan	5	4	4	4	17	3
Minnesota	5	5	4	5	19	2
Nebraska	1	1	2	1	5	12
New York	3	5	3	5	16	4
Tennessee	5	4	2	2	13	7
Texas	5	1	4	1	11	8
Wisconsin	5	5	5	5	20	1

Scoring Procedure: The above scores vary from 5 points for great involvement to 1 point for no involvement. See APPENDIX for scoring procedure.

By way of analysis, the index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making, as a dependent variable, was correlated with other selected variables using the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient (Rho), an appropriate statistic for ranked data when the number of cases is small.²¹ As a guideline for the interpretation of Rho , a correlation of .3 to .4 indicates only a trend, .5 to .6 indicates a moderate association, and .7 or higher indicates a strong degree of association. These associations indicate the direction and the degree of the relationships between variables and cannot be extended to cause and effect.

The index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was correlated with selected socioeconomic, political, resource, and policy-making influence variables, as shown in Table 4. Of the socioeconomic variables there was only a slight association (.38) between the Hofferbert-Sharkansky industrialization index and governors' involvement in education.

There were two political variables moderately associated with governors' involvement. The technical effectiveness of state legislatures, as determined by the Citizens' Conference on State Legislatures, was correlated .55 with the involvement index. There was an association of .44 between the Elazar-Sharkansky index of political culture and governors' involvement in education.* Thus, states having some history of reform-orientation in state government such as Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan were ranked high in

*The Elazar-Sharkansky index is a measure of the extent to which states are moralistic in political culture, rather than individualistic or traditionalistic.

having moralistic political cultures and legislatures with greater technical effectiveness. In these states governors were found to have been more involved in educational policy making.

TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNORS' EDUCATIONAL
POLICY-MAKING INVOLVEMENT, AND SELECTED VARIABLES

Selected Variables	Governors' Educational Policy-Making Involvement
<u>Socioeconomic Variables</u>	
State Population Size, 1970	.29
Educational Attainment, 1970 ^a	-.06
Affluence (Hofferbert-Sharkansky)	-.16
Per Capita Personal Income, 1972	.08
Industrialization (Hofferbert-Sharkansky)	.38
Per Cent Urban Population, 1970	.06
<u>Political Variables</u>	
Inter-party Competition (Kanney)	.27
State Legislatures' Technical Effectiveness (Citizens' Conference)	.55
Political Culture (Elazar-Sharkansky)	.44
Voter Turnout	.15
<u>Resource Variables</u>	
Governors' Formal Powers (Schlesinger)	.33
Size of Governors' Personal Staff Working in Education	.29
Access to Legislative Party Resources ^b	.40
<u>Policy-Making Influence Variables</u>	
CSSO Influence in the S&A Arena ^c	.18
CSSO Influence in the Legislative Arena ^c	.18
SBE Overall Policy-Making Influenced ^d	.06
Legislators' Perceptions of EIG Influence ^e	.13

^aPer Cent of State Pop. 25 yrs. or older who completed four years of high school.

^bAn index determined by political party competitiveness in legislatures and governors' political party line-up in legislatures. See APPENDIX for scoring procedure.

^cSee R.F. Campbell, "The Chief State School Officer as A Policy Actor," in State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis, R.F. Campbell and T.L. Mazzone Jr., eds. (Columbus: Ed. Gov. Project, August 74).

^dTim L. Mazzone Jr., "The Policy-Making Influence of State Boards of Education," *Ibid.*

^eAlan Aufderheide, "Educational Interest Groups and The State Legislature," *Ibid.*

There were two resource variables slightly associated with the involvement index, including access to legislative party resources (.40) and the Schlesinger index of governors' formal powers (.33). Interestingly, there were no correlations of any size between governors' involvement in education and selected policy-making influence variables involving chief state school officers, state boards of education, and educational interest groups. In regard to the influence of CSSOs, Campbell found that CSSOs differed in their policy-making influence depending on whether chiefs were dealing in the state education agency arena or the legislative arena.²² Yet, there was little correlation (Kho -.02) between the CSSOs'

policy-making influence in the two arenas: "A chief could have influence in one arena and little influence in the other."²³ But even where CSSOs were perceived to be influential in the legislative arena (Texas, Georgia, California, Michigan, Florida), there was no correlation of any size (.18) with the index of gubernatorial involvement in education. We may speculate that in states where governors have weak formal powers and the inability to mobilize political party support in legislatures, such as in Texas and Georgia, these deficiencies may have contributed to the CSSOs' relative policy-making strength in the legislative arena. Such speculation does not hold in other states such as California and Michigan, where both governors and CSSOs were relatively influential in the legislature. It must be concluded that governors' involvement in education appears to occur independent of the policy-making influence of the other major educational actors involved in this research.

There were much stronger associations between governors' educational involvement and some of the school finance and tax variables, as shown in Table 5. There were strong correlations

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNORS' EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING INVOLVEMENT, AND MEASURES OF SCHOOL FINANCE AND TAXATION

School Finance and Tax Measures	Governors' Educational Policy-Making Involvement
<u>Need</u>	
School-age Population as Per Cent of Total Resident Population, 1972	.28
Per Cent of Charge in Public School Enrollment, 1962 to 1972	.30
<u>Ability</u>	
Personal Income per Child of School Age, 1972	.06
<u>Educational Effort</u>	
Public School Revenue Receipts as a Per Cent of Personal Income, 1971	.75
<u>Educational Expenditures</u>	
Per Capita State expenditures for All Education, 1971	.64
<u>General Tax Effort</u>	
State and Local Tax Collections as a Per Cent of Personal Income, 1971	.50
<u>State Tax Burden</u>	
State Tax Burden as Per Cent of Personal Income, 1971	.87

between the involvement index and state tax burden (.87), between the involvement index and educational effort (.75), and between

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the involvement index and educational expenditures (.64). Not surprisingly, educational effort was associated .67 with state tax burden. But the magnitude of these correlations indicate that in states where greater state tax efforts were made to create revenue and where states demonstrated effort to support education, there was greater likelihood of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making.

Findings

1. Governors have become involved in educational policy making. In this population of twelve states, nine governors had included education as a 1970 campaign issue. Education may provide a more attractive campaign issue than one for a sustained legislative program. Legislators interviewed in Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Tennessee regarding governors' means of influence in legislatures mentioned that governors were quick to give verbal support to education but frequently had not followed through with legislative programs for education. The index of gubernatorial involvement in education showed that some governors, as in Wisconsin and Minnesota, were involved in all stages of the policy process in education. Other governors, as in Georgia and Texas, were involved in education in the issue definition stage but much less involved in proposal formulation. On the other hand, some governors as in California and New York were not particularly involved in issue definition but were very much involved in decision enactment.

2. Governors varied in the extent of their overall involvement in education. Based upon the total score on which the involvement index was based, the Wisconsin and Minnesota governors had been greatly involved in education. Governors in Michigan, New York, and Florida were considerably involved, and governors in California and Tennessee were moderately involved in educational policy making. The Texas Governor was slightly involved. Governors in Georgia, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Nebraska were involved hardly at all in educational policy making.

3. Governors differed according to the nature of their involvement in educational policy making. Some governors (Minn, Mich, Fla, Wisc) were oriented toward achieving fiscal reform in school finance and taxation. Other governors (Cal, NY) were oriented more toward holding the line on state spending and restraining increases for education. Although inactive in educational policy making, the Nebraska Governor held to a campaign pledge of no tax increase by vetoing a major school finance bill. Three governors (Ga, Tenn, Tex) were oriented toward expansion of specific educational programs. Governors in Colorado and Massachusetts had not been involved in educational policy making.

4. Governors had resource capacities for independent involvement in educational policy making. There were gubernatorial aides in all twelve states who worked either full or part-time on educational matters. These aides tended to be hired by governors currently in office, and nearly half had previous state government or political experience. Only five of the twenty-four staff who were interviewed had previous professional experience in education, and none came directly from the public schools. Higher educational positions appeared to provide the recruitment route for governors' education aides. While gubernatorial staff made use of outside informational resources in education, policy advice and recommendations were the province of the governor's personal staff.

Not only did governors have the capacity for involvement in education, but also they became involved independent of the influence of chief state school officers, state boards of education, and educational interest groups. One resource used with some success was the citizen commission or task force. Such groups were found in half of the states, but were utilized by all four governors categorized as reform-oriented in school finance. Particularly when critical fiscal policy positions must be formulated by governors, the legitimacy of the citizen committee may provide the governor with an important resource.

5. Governors were crucial in the formulation and initiation of fiscal legislation affecting school finance and tax reform. Virtually all twelve governors were involved in either the initiation or attempted initiation of policy. Even in the states where governors had not been particularly active in education, one governor initiated a school finance proposal in 1973, another attempted a graduated income tax, and a third exercised executive veto power over a school finance bill. It is to be noted that in the states where gubernatorial involvement in education was the greatest, school finance and tax reform were major issues in the early 1970s (Wisc, Minn, Mich, Fla). In California, New York, and Massachusetts, governors were somewhat less involved in education. In these "megastates" one finds characteristically a rather high level of educational attainment, and the Schlesinger index showed that they were among the more powerful governors in formal powers.²⁴ Nonetheless, they were not as involved in educational policy making in 1972 and 1973.

6. The structure for education and state government is only one among several important policy-making elements. In Tennessee structural arrangements may result in gubernatorial involvement in education if only because the Governor appoints the Commissioner of Education. Structure in New York and Wisconsin tended to insulate education from state government, yet governors became involved in spite of structure. The New York Governor appointed an Inspector General as a "watchdog" over education, and the Wisconsin Governor used the recommendations of a task force and carried a proposal for school aid equalization to successful legislative enactment. In the other nine states, governors had mixed control over SEAs. No causal relationships were identified.

7. The correlational analysis showed that selected fiscal variables of state tax burden, educational effort, and educational expenditures were associated most strongly with the index of gubernatorial involvement in education. Analysis of school finance and

tax variables provided the key to explaining gubernatorial involvement in education. First, strong relationships existed between governors' educational involvement and state tax effort, educational effort, and educational expenditures. States making greater fiscal efforts to support education had governors who were generally more involved in education. Governors were drawn into education as finance-related issues became critical state problems in the early 1970s.

Second, in those states where governors were more involved in education, their concerns about education as a fiscal issue of major significance were unmistakable. Thus, the catalyst for gubernatorial involvement in education was a fiscal one, and education moved into state-level prominence because of its demand on property owners. At the same time states began to experience fiscal crises because available revenue could not match upward cost spirals of state services. Additionally, court cases brought attention to state school finance systems unable to provide sufficient equalization.

Implications and Conclusions

In the early 1970s, public pressure for solutions to fiscal problems forced governors to make policy choices among alternatives. Yet, governors differed in their responses. Four governors (Wisc, Minn, Mich, Fla) dealt with the issues directly and worked toward their solution in legislatures. The California Governor's prime interest was in tax reform. Decisions on school finance in New York were deferred to a future legislative session. The Colorado and Massachusetts governors attempted policy initiation. The Texas Governor encouraged others to propose solutions. No major issue embracing school finance and taxation arose in Georgia and Tennessee. The Nebraska Governor reacted to a legislative proposal in school finance.

Governors' roles in state educational policy making were examined from the perspective of involvement. Other areas involving the role of the chief executive could be studied including

influence, contextual conditions, and state-local relationships in policy implementation. Implications of executive involvement provide another topic for investigation, but a review of the outcome of the 1974 general election may be useful.

Clearly, 1974 proved to be a banner year for Democrats, and the microcosm of this twelve-state population was no exception. After the 1970 election, these twelve governors were evenly balanced between the two major political parties. By the end of 1974, two Republican governors had chosen not to seek re-election, and three others were soundly defeated at the polls. Only one Republican governor was re-elected in Michigan. Of the seven governors who were re-elected, five had been involved in education during their terms of office. Four of the five had been quite involved in working toward fiscal reform in education, and one (Nebraska) had taken a position somewhat critical of education.

Education may have become a legislative issue on which public officials must take a stand. The correlational analysis indicated that some governors became involved in education by formulating policy proposals in school finance because of the importance of fiscal matters to the states. As a statewide issue, education no longer stands in isolation from other state issues. As educational involvement has increased, governors' political viability may be affected by their educational positions.

Communication with executive staff in each of the states, however, established that education was not a primary campaign issue for governors in 1974. As a campaign topic, education may provide political leaders with an opportunity to state a generalized interest in education. But specific educational issues such as busing and school finance may tend to mask deeper concerns about racial issues and home rule. Taking firm positions on such emotion-laden issues during campaigning can prove costly to a would-be official.

Keeping education apart from politics has been refuted because decisions about education are being made increasingly in the legislative arena. As one of the twelve governors put it:

I see, for example, a deeper understanding of the problems of education in many of our legislatures, and a determination to do something about it.²⁵

Legislators and governors have had the potential for involvement in educational policy making. This research dealt with the educational involvement of governors. Based upon this analysis, governors have activated their potential and have become involved in state policy making for the public schools.

FOOTNOTES

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¹Edward R. Hines, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of New York," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, January 1974), p. 101.

²Joseph C. Rost, "The Merger of The University of Wisconsin and The Wisconsin State University Systems: A Case Study in the Politics of Education," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1973).

³Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni Jr., "State Governance Models for the Public Schools," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, August 1974).

⁴Cynthia Wornom, "Rhodes' Hatchet May Fall on Regents," The Lantern, Ohio State University, Columbus, January 24, 1975.

⁵Tim L. Mazzoni Jr., "The Educational Governance Project: Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology," unpublished paper prepared for the Annual Meeting, American Educational Research Association, Chicago, April 17, 1974.

⁶Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni Jr., "The State Governance of Education: A Progress Report," unpublished paper prepared for Regional Conferences, (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, October 1973).

⁷Edward Schneier, ed., Policy Making in American Government, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. xi - xii.

⁸JAlan Aufderheide, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of California," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, February 1974), pp. 47 - 52.

⁹Edward R. Hines, op. cit., pp. 51 - 54.

¹⁰Donald P. Sprengel, Gubernatorial Staff: Functional and Political Profiles, (Iowa City: Institute of Public Affairs, 1969), p. 3.

¹¹See Table 5-7 "General Characteristics of Members of Governors' Personal Staffs whose Responsibilities include Education," in Edward R. Hines, "Governors and Educational Policy Making," in "State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis," R.F. Campbell and T.L. Mazzoni Jr., eds., (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, August 1974), p. 225.

¹²Donald P. Sprengel, op. cit., pp. 15 - 17.

¹³Coleman B. Ransone Jr., The Office of Governor in the United States, (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), p. 157.

¹⁴Edward R. Hines, JAlan Aufderheide, Peggy M. Siegel, Linda C. Moffatt, and William E. Smith, "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Michigan," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, June 1974), pp. 58 - 87.

¹⁵Tim L. Mazzoni Jr., "The Policy-Making Influence of State Boards of Education," in "State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis," R.F. Campbell and T.L. Mazzoni Jr., eds., (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, August 1974), p. 39.

¹⁶See JAlan Aufderheide, "The Place of Educational Interest Groups in State Educational Policy-Making Systems," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1973).

¹⁷For legislative political party line-up in the twelve states in 1971 and 1973, see Table 5-11 in Edward R. Hines, "Governors and Educational Policy Making," op. cit., p. 245.

¹⁸See Thomas R. Dye, "State Legislative Politics," in Politics in the American States, 2d edition, H. Jacob and K.N. Vines, eds., (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 163 - 209, and Sara P. McCally, "The Governor and his Legislative Party," American Political Science Review, 60 (December 1966), pp. 923 - 942.

¹⁹Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Jacob and Vines, op. cit., pp. 85 - 89.

²⁰Tim L. Mazzoni Jr., "State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Minnesota," (Columbus: The Educational Governance Project, June 1974), p. 163.

²¹H.M. Downie and R.W. Heath, Basic Statistical Methods, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 122 - 123.

²²Roald F. Campbell, "The Chief State School Officer as A Policy Actor," in "State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis," op. cit., p. 48.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Neal R. Pierce, The Megastates of America, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), and Rankings of The States, 1973, (Washington: NEA Research Division, 1973), where on the measure of "Per Cent of Population Age 25 and Older with 4 Years of College or More, 1970," California ranked 7th, New York ranked 14th, and Massachusetts ranked 11th.

²⁵Rubin O'D. Askew, Governor of Florida, Speech presented at the Annual Meeting, Education Commission of The States, Miami, Florida, June 20, 1974.

CONSTRUCTING GUBERNATORIAL VARIABLES

Involvement Index

The index of gubernatorial involvement in educational policy making was constructed by assigning points to the extent of governors' involvement in each of the four policy-making stages.

Scoring for governors' involvement in support mobilization was based on case study data according to the extent to which governors were involved in mobilizing the SEA (primarily the CSSO), EIG leaders, and legislative leaders when major fiscal legislation affecting public schools was considered by the legislature. The scoring procedure was:

Mobilizing the SEA	1 point
Not mobilizing the SEA	0 points
Considerably involved in mobilizing EIG leaders	2 points
Somewhat involved in mobilizing EIG leaders	1 point
Not involved in mobilizing EIG leaders	0 points
Greatly involved in mobilizing legislative leaders	3 points
Considerably involved in mobilizing legislative leaders	2 points
Somewhat involved in mobilizing legislative leaders	1 point

Assigned scores for governors' involvement in support mobilization are shown below:

	Mob. SEA	Mob. EIG Leaders	Mob. Legis. Leaders	Total
California	1	0	3	4
Colorado	1	0	1	2
Florida	1	0	2	3
Georgia	0	0	1	1
Massachusetts	0	1	1	2
Michigan	1	1	2	4
Minnesota	0	1	3	4
Nebraska	0	1	1	2
New York	0	0	3	3
Tennessee	0	0	1	1
Texas	1	2	1	4
Wisconsin	0	2	3	5

Scoring for governors' involvement in issue definition was based on perceptual and case study data. Scoring for governors'

involvement in proposal formulation was based on case study data according to gubernatorial involvement as the key initiator of educational policy proposals. Scoring for governors' involvement in decision enactment was based on case study according to the extent of governors' involvement in the final enactment of the legislative decision affecting school finance and tax reform. Points were assigned as follows:

Great involvement	5 points
Considerable involvement	4 points
Moderate involvement	3 points
Slight involvement	2 points
Virtually no involvement	1 point

Access to Legislative Party Resources

Governors' access to legislative party resources, as a resource variable, was based on data regarding inter-party competition and political party line-up. Two assumptions were made: 1) that governors had greater access to legislative party resources in the more politically competitive states such as two party, rather than in one party states, and 2) that governors had greater access to legislative party resources where they had political party majorities in legislatures, rather than a majority in only one house or minorities in both houses. The ranking below indicates that the New York Governor was considered to have the greatest access to legislative party resources. Using case study data as a tie-breaking mechanism, an eleven-state ranking for governors was derived. Nebraska was excluded because of its non-partisan elections.

GOVERNORS' ACCESS TO LEGISLATIVE PARTY RESOURCES

	Degree of Pol. Party Competitiveness	Governors' Political Party Line-up	Ranking
California	Competitive	Split ^a	6
Colorado	Competitive	Majority	2
Florida	Semi-competitive	Majority	8
Georgia	Non-competitive	Majority	9
Massachusetts	Competitive	Majority	7
Michigan	Competitive	Split ^a	5
Minnesota	Competitive	Majority	3
New York	Competitive	Majority	1
Tennessee	Non-competitive	Minority	11
Texas	Non-competitive	Majority	10
Wisconsin	Competitive	Split ^a	4

^aA split political party line-up is defined as governors having less than majorities in both houses but more than minorities in both houses. Thus, a majority in one house and a minority in the other would be considered to be "split" in political party line-up. Either a majority or a minority in one house in an evenly-divided line-up in the other would also be considered as "split."